Abstract
1
• N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of retailers, or players;
22
• T be the number of discrete time periods;
23
• D i t be the demand faced by player i in period t, for all i ∈ N and t = 1, . . . , T ;
24
• c t (x) be the cost of ordering x units in period t, for all t = 1, . . . , T ;
25
• h t be the unit holding cost in period t, for t = 1, . . . , T .
26
We assume that c t (·) is concave and nondecreasing, and that c t (0) = 0 for all t = 1, . . . , T . In x t ≥ 0, I t ≥ 0 for all t = 1, . . . , T, (1.1d) where x t is the amount ordered in period t, and I t is the amount of inventory at the end of each 32 period t, for all t = 1, . . . , T . Here constraints (1.1b)-(1.1c) regulate the flow of product between 33 inventory, ordering, and demand. The cooperative game (N, v) is an ELS game.
34
Suppose that χ ∈ R N is a cost allocation: for each player i ∈ N , χ i is the cost allocated to The constraint (1.2a) ensures that the cost allocation χ is budget-balanced ; that is, the sum of the costs 38 2 allocated to all of the players equals the joint cost that they incur together. 
43
In this work, we study the core of ELS games. In particular, we focus on how to efficiently 44 compute a cost allocation in the core of these games. 
Previous related work

46
The economic lot-sizing problem was first studied by Wagner and Whitin (1958) x t · I t−1 = 0 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
Zangwill (1969) proved a similar property for ELS problems with backlogging and a general concave
77
cost function.
78
Instead of the mathematical program (1.1), we will use an alternate mathematical program 79 that directly finds a minimum cost zero-inventory policy for the underlying ELS problem of v(S).
80
Before presenting this mathematical program, we need the following well-known lemma, recast in 81 the context of ELS games.
82
Lemma 2.1. Any instance of an ELS game (N, v) as described above is equivalent to another 83 instance of an ELS game (N,v) with zero holding costs, where
is the cost of ordering x units in period t, for each t = 1, . . . , T . In particular, for any S ∈ 2 N ,
Proof. By adding constraints (1.1b) and (1.1c), and substituting this in the objective function (1.1a),
86
4 we obtain the result.
87
Note that for each t = 1, . . . , T , we have thatc t (·) is nondecreasing and concave, and thatc t (0) = 0.
88
A zero-inventory policy can be viewed as a set of disjoint time intervals that cover the entire 89 time horizon. With this in mind, consider the following formulation for v(S), based on finding the 90 minimum cost zero-inventory policy of the underlying ELS problem: 
The dual of its LP relaxation is: said to be an exact cover if for each t = 1, . . . , T , there is exactly one (i, j) ∈ E such that i ≤ t ≤ j.
110
Algorithm 3.1 (Primal-dual algorithm for ELS games). Set α 1 , . . . , α T as active.
114
while at least one α t is active do
115
Simultaneously increase the value of all active α t 's with the time counter until
for some i ≤ j.
117
Make α i , α i+1 , . . . , α j inactive (or leave them inactive, if already inactive).
118
C ← C ∪ (i, j).
119
end while
120
Find a subset E ⊆ C such that E is an exact cover.
Compute the core cost allocation
Before proving the correctness of the above algorithm, we first show some properties of the Proof. For all t = 1, . . . , T and any time in the algorithm τ , let α t (τ ) be the value of α t at time τ .
132
We show (a) by induction. The claim holds at the beginning of the algorithm, since α 1 , . . . , α T 
First, we claim that
Note that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ T 1 , we have that
In addition, for all t such that 1 ≤ t ≤ T 1 , we have that α t (τ ) = τ , since α t is active for all such t. 
Sincec i (d) is nondecreasing and concave in d, andc i (0) = 0, we have
and thus (3.2) holds.
142
Now let τ be some time before τ when the algorithm made a constraint tight. Let α T +1 , . . . , α T 2 143 be the newly inactive variables at time τ , for some T , T 2 such that T 1 ≤ T < T 2 ≤ T . Note that 144 if T 2 < T , then (T 2 + 1, T 3 ) ∈ C, for some T 3 such that T 2 < T 3 ≤ T . We have that
We claim that
or equivalently,
Note that α t (τ ) = τ for t = T + 1, . . . , T 2 . The claim holds, since the fact thatc i (d) is concave
By (3.1) and (3.3), we conclude that ∆τ is achieved when one of the following constraints since the value of the α t 's are raised together until they become inactive, (a) implies (c).
154
The following theorem shows that Algorithm 3. 
Hence, by strong duality, α * is an optimal solution to [D N ], and x * is an optimal solution to [C N ].
159
At every iteration, the algorithm spends O(T 2 ) time to determine the next tight constraint and 160 which α t 's become inactive. The algorithm runs through at most T iterations. Finally, an exact 161 cover can be found in O(T ) time. Therefore, the algorithm runs in O(T 3 ) time.
162
Note that these results provide an alternate, algorithmic proof of Theorem 2.2. Finally, we put 163 all these above results together to show that Algorithm 3.1 computes a cost allocation in the core of 164 an ELS game.
165
Theorem 3.4. Suppose (N, v) is an ELS game. Then, the cost allocation χ computed by Algo-166 rithm 3.1 is in the core of (N, v). Furthermore, Algorithm 3.1 runs in polynomial time.
167
Proof. By Theorem 3.3, the solution α * output by Algorithm 3.1 is an optimal solution to [D N ]. Therefore, by Theorem 2.2,
Hence χ is budget-balanced. Moreover, since α * t ≥ α * t+1 for all t = 1, . . . , T − 1, by Lemma 2.3, for 170 any S ∈ 2 N , we have
So, α * is a feasible solution to [D S ] for any S ∈ 2 N . It follows that
Therefore, χ is stable, and so χ is in the core of (N, v).
173
One might wonder if Algorithm 3.1 can be applied directly to an ELS game without the formulation, c ij is defined as min i≤l≤j c l (
where h retailers incurs the minimum ordering and inventory cost required to satisfy their joint demands.
193
We call this setting an economic lot-sizing game with remanufacturing, or ELSR game for short.
194
We define an ELSR game (N, v) formally as follows. Let T be the number of discrete time It is straightforward to show that this game has an empty core.
226
On the other hand, we can show that ELSR games under condition (4.2) have a non-empty core, 
